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This paper studies the effect of business partners on the commercialization of nvention based ventures,
and it assesses the relative importance of partners’ human and social capital on commercialization
outcomes. Projects run by partnerships were five times more likely to reach commercialization, and
they had mean revenues approximately ten times greater than projects run by solo-entrepreneurs. These
gross differences may be due both to business partners’ value added and to selection. After controlling
for selection effects and observed/unobserved heterogeneity, our smallest estimate of partner value
added approximately doubles the probability of commercialization and increases expected revenues
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Venture capital is now recognized to play an important role in entrepreneurship and ﬁnancial
intermediation. The volume of venture capital commitments –whether in the form of formal
venture capital (VC) or informal venture capital– is large. As a natural consequence, whether
early stage ﬁnanciers bring value added to start-ups has become a subject of interest in the
entrepreneurial ﬁnance literature. However, while scholars have examined the value added by
venture fund investors to new ventures, relatively little is still known about the value added of
informal venture capital such as angels and business partners, a sector which, by some estimates,
is as large or larger than the VC sector.1
In this paper we investigate the impact of informal venture capital on early stage ventures
by relying on a survey which documents the human, social, and ﬁnancial capital contribution of
business partners to inventive projects. The raw data from the survey shows a very important
role for business partners in commercialization success; the rate of commercialization of projects
run by partnerships (0.30) is ﬁve times larger than those run by solo entrepreneurs (0.06), and
the revenues of projects undertaken by partnerships are almost ten times as large as those run
by solo entrepreneurs. The survey answers on the provision of human, social, and ﬁnancial
capital contributions, with some assumptions, allow us to identify how much of these gross eﬀects
represent value of obtaining human and social capital while controlling for selection of projects
into partnerships. In addition, we provide a simple model to illustrate the value added of informal
venture capital, and the sources of selection. The main focus of the paper, however, is to identify
empirically the impact of informal venture capital on early stage ventures.
Informal venture capital shares with VCs the role as ﬁnancial intermediaries, but have some-
what diﬀerent objectives and modes of operation. Informal venture capital investors typically
make only a few investments at a time, tend to invest substantially smaller amounts than VCs,
invest their savings on their own or in syndication with other private persons, and they more
often than VCs invest in early-stage deals. They are geographically widely distributed and make
most investments locally. As opposed to institutional investors they do not, generally, rely on
traditional control mechanisms, such as board control, staging or contractual provisions. They
rather spend time ’hands-on’ in the business or exercise control through other mechanisms such
as trust or social inﬂuence. Many are active investors who seek to contribute their experience,
1For example, Reynolds (2005) reports the informal investor sector to $162 billion per year over the period 2000-
2004, while formal venture capital were reported to provide $45 billion per year to start-ups during 2000-2003. More
recently, Sohl (2010), reports U.S. angel investors to have provided $17.6 billion in ﬁnancing for 57,225 projects in
2009 and the (U.S.) National Venture Capital Association report that formal venture capital in the same period
provided $17.7 billion in ﬁnancing for 2,795 projects, of which $1.6 billion went to 312 startups.
2knowledge and contacts to the investee; they often invest in sectors where they have had previous
experience, while others are passive investors. Furthermore, informal venture capital takes vari-
ous forms ranging from the most structured (groups of angels) to the least (individual angels and
business partners).2
Focusing our empirical analysis on business partners is interesting on its own. Business part-
nerships are important for the economy; approximately 10% of all U.S. businesses are partnerships
and 18% of business receipts are from partnerships.3 Business partners appear even more impor-
tant for start-ups. For example, in the panel study of entrepreneurial dynamics, 52% of start-ups
were partnerships (Ruef, Aldrich, and Carter, 2003). But to our knowledge the literature has not
clariﬁed speciﬁcally why business partners are so important for start-ups. Reﬂecting conventional
wisdom, the business press commonly advises entrepreneurs to partner with people in order to
increase the chances to commercialize their ideas. However, the empirical evidence on the value of
this advice is scattered.4 More importantly, little is known about the mechanisms through which
business partnerships are formed.
Documenting that early stage ﬁnanciers provide a real impact to start-ups has been diﬃcult
(Hellmann and Puri, 2000; Hall and Lerner, 2010). There are several complicating factors when
trying to quantify the value added of early stage ﬁnanciers — self-selection and sorting being of
primary concern. For instance, if inventions commercialized by partnerships have higher revenues
than inventions commercialized by solo entrepreneurs it may reﬂe c tt h a tp a r t n e r sp r o v i d ev a l u e
added in the form of human or social capital, but it may also reﬂect that partners join inventors
with better inventions (selection on invention quality), or that inventors with better inventions,
whom on average are more likely to be credit constrained, enlist partners to obtain ﬁnancing
(selection on demand for ﬁnancing). The policy implications are vastly diﬀerent depending on the
answer; in the latter case one might ask if there are available policies to relax credit constraints.
In the former case one might instead ask for policies to improve the eﬃciency of the market
for ﬁnding business partners. Both policies are currently in use in Europe to stimulate business
2Using a representative survey of 22,000 U.S. households, Bygrave and Reynolds (2006) show that as much as
5% of household are informal venture investors, 50% of their investments are received by a relative, 28.5% by a
friend or neighbor, 6.1% by a colleague at work, and 9.4% by a stranger. For further descriptive evidence of the
informal venture capital sector, see Harrison, Mason, and Robson (2010); Kerr, Lerner, and Schoar (2010) ; Mason
(2009); VanOsnabrugge and Robinson (2000); Wong, Bhatia, and Freeman (2009); Wiltbank and Boeker (2007);
and Wiltbank (2009).
3Statistics of Income, http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/0„id=175843,00.html. The approximately 3.1 million
U.S. partnerships in 2007 had 18.5 million partners. Excluding limited and limited liability partnerships (popular
investment vehicles in the movie and construction industries), there were 852,000 U.S. partnerships with 3.9 million
partners.
4Cressy (1996) and Astebro and Bernhard (2003) both report substantial eﬀects on the survival of new ﬁrms of
the number of owners.
3formation (Mason, 2009), but without apparent knowledge of their respective eﬃcacy. Thus,
understanding the mechanisms behind partnership formation matters both for economic policy
and business strategy.
To illustrate how we will disentangle the selection eﬀects from value added, we develop a
model of invention commercialization with business partner selection. Our model describes the
choice of an individual deciding whether to commercialize an invention on her own or to form
a partnership. Individuals are endowed with both an invention and limited wealth. Partners
can provide human and social capital to increase the productivity of capital, and may also relax
liquidity constraints. Forming a partnership involves a sunk cost. Partnership formation therefore
depends on the partner’s potential contribution of human and social capital and the extent to
which an inventor is liquidity constrained. The model shows how selection on invention quality
and demand for ﬁnancing can jointly arise.
Our empirical analysis uses data from invention projects through a survey of Canadian in-
dividual inventors using the Invention Assessment Program at the Canadian Innovation Center
(CIC). The data reveal that in approximately 21 percent of the projects the inventor was joined
by business partners. The primary reason for the inventor to create a partnership was to obtain
human capital (65%), followed by obtaining ﬁnancing (51%), and social capital (42%), indicating
a broad array of resources provided by partners. These partners take on substantial risk. In our
sample the average pre-revenue external investments are approximately $29,500 (2003 Cdn $),
when the average probability of commercialization is 0.11.
Regression analysis show that there is selection into partnerships based on the quality of the
invention and the demand for ﬁnancing. High-quality assessed invention projects by the CIC
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expenditures were over four times larger for projects eventually joined by partners than for solo-
runs. We also test model implications stating that; a) the probability to form a partnership with
ﬁnancing should increase with invention quality, and b) the partnership eﬀect should decline once
controlling for the amount of external ﬁnancing and c) the marginal return to external ﬁnancing
should be less than for internal ﬁnancing. Regression analysis support all three predictions.
To examine value added we use commercialization success as our key dependent variable: the
log of business revenues. Other studies have used business survival, raising of venture capital or
time to IPO as proxies for business success. For this sample we believe that commercialization
revenues is an appropriate measure of business success as most of these businesses have limited
opportunity to raise formal venture capital or be listed on major stock exchanges, and business
survival may be capturing the subjective value of staying an entrepreneur. Accounting for selection
4on invention quality in Tobit regressions of commercialization revenues signiﬁcantly reduces the
eﬀect that forming a partnership has on commercialization success, but a signiﬁcant partnership
eﬀect remains.
Three additional mechanisms may explain the remaining partnership eﬀect: The role of com-
mercialization investment, external ﬁnancing, and labor eﬀort. Indeed, accounting for these mech-
anisms reduces the partnership eﬀect further. The remaining partnership eﬀect, however, is still
economically signiﬁcant after applying these controls.
We use two alternative approaches to control for additional heterogeneity. In the ﬁrst approach
we control for selection on measurable inventor and invention characteristics into partnerships
using a propensity score weighted Tobit model. This further reduces the size of the partnership
coeﬃcient. However, the remaining partnership coeﬃcient still represents at least 46% of the
coeﬃcient’s original size. At the sample mean, partners’ human and social capital thus increases
the probability of commercialization between 0.06 and 0.09 percentage points when the probability
of commercialization is 0.06 for solo entrepreneurs, and increase expected revenues by at least 29%.
In the second approach we control for unobserved heterogeneity. To do so we test an implica-
tion of our model: once controlling for the capital investment, a partner that is said to exclusively
provide ﬁnancing should not provide any further value added to the project. If a partnership ef-
fect remains in such a project, it must therefore indicate selection on unobservables. We can thus
construct a lower bound on the value added of partner ability. Implementing this speciﬁcation,
we ﬁnd a lower bound of partner value added providing at least a 0.06 percentage points increase
in the probability of commercialization, and at least a 38% increase in expected revenues. Both
approaches thus deliver the same message: the value added of partners’ human and social capital
is very large.
Our paper is related to those examining the value added of formal venture capital to entre-
preneurs and the economy. This literature tries to identify if VC ﬁnancing improves business
performance and innovation (Kortum and Lerner, 2000; Mollica and Zingales, 2007), and if VCs
additional resources (such as a big rolodex) add value to the start-up (see Hellmann and Puri,
2000; Hellmann and Puri, 2002; Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu, 2005; Chemmanur, Krishnan, and
Nandy, 2009). Several papers show that the reputation of a VC acts as a signal of the quality of
the venture, indicating that some VCs may be selected by entrepreneurs because they add value
beyond ﬁnancing (see Meggison and Weiss, 1991; Hsu, 2004; Sorensen, 2008). Hall and Lerner
(2010) summarizes this literature stating that it has been a challenge so far to clearly document
value added by early stage investors.5
5The ﬁrst paper acknowledging the possibility that venture funding and innovation could be positively related to
5Closest to our paper is Kerr, Lerner, and Schoar (2010) who empirically demonstrate a positive
eﬀect of obtaining angel ﬁnancing, among angel ﬁnancing applicants, on survival and access
to follow-on funding of high-growth start-up ﬁrms using a regression discontinuity approach.
Similarly to Kerr et al. (2010), we estimate the relative importance of early stage informal venture
capital to inventive projects, and we address the potential endogeneity of ﬁnancing. Our paper,
however, diﬀers from Kerr et al. (2010) in at least four aspects. First, we do not restrict the source
of informal venture capital. Second, by using two proxies of pre-partnership invention quality, we
control for selection into partnerships based on invention quality and demand for ﬁnancing. Third,
to guide analysis we provide a formal model of the partnering process to identify the precise eﬀects
of selection into partnerships, commercialization investments, external ﬁnancing, labor eﬀort, and
value added in the form of human and social capital. Finally, we take a diﬀerent stand by
empirically identifying the marginal eﬀect of the partners human and social capital on both the
probability of commercialization and expected commercialization revenues, while also purging
estimation from the eﬀects of external ﬁnancing, and observed and unobserved heterogeneity in
two distinct ways.
There is also a large related literature on teamwork eﬃciency which analyzes bargaining issues
and contract design primarily as it applies to team production in large established ﬁrms (see
review by Lazear and Shaw, 2007). In this paper we abstract away from bargaining issues, which
nevertheless might be important.
Our work also contributes to the literature on the choice of entrepreneurship. In a paper
also relevant to the subject, Lazear (2005) develops a theory of entrepreneurs as jacks-of-all-
trades where he assumes that the entrepreneur must perform all business tasks and the choice of
entrepreneurship is a strict function of his worst skill. The model we propose distances itself from
Lazear’s in that we allow individuals to add partners to obtain the required skills. Furthermore,
our work is distinct to Holmes and Schmitz (1990), who develop a theory of entrepreneurship with
specialization and business transfers. We focus on the process and beneﬁts of partnerships and,
accordingly, we abstract from the possibility that the inventor may instead transfer her invention
to others.6 Finally, Evans and Jovanovic (1989) studied the degree to which personal wealth
provides a binding liquidity constraint for a single individual’s choice between entrepreneurship
and wage work. We instead focus on individuals that already have an entrepreneurial idea and
who may ﬁnd partners to relax liquidity constraints for commercial entry.
an unobserved factor (e.g., the arrival of technological opportunities, the quality of the venture) was by Hellmann
and Puri (2000).
6We ﬁnd only 5 inventors that were able to transfer their idea for cash to another entity. Those 5 are deleted
from analysis.
62 A model of selection into business partnerships
The economy is populated by inventors and business partners. Inventors are endowed with a unit
of labor, an invention of quality  and assets .7 T h ei n v e n t o rc a nu s eh e ru n i to fl a b o rt o
commercialize the invention. The invention quality and assets are distributed with cdf  and
are independent. Business partners are also endowed with a unit of time. The partner can use
their unit of time to contribute complementary human and/or social capital as well as ﬁnancing.
The partner’s social and human capital ability are randomly drawn from a cdf . We assume
that both the inventor and partner have an inelastic supply of labor and will therefore spend their
unit of time in the venture. Every inventor meets a partner with positive probability. Inventions
can be commercialized by the inventor on her own or with a partner. 8
If the invention is commercialized by the inventor on her own, the proﬁts are   =  +
( − ) where  is the amount of commercialization capital invested in the business,  is
the interest rate (i.e., the opportunity cost of capital), and  ∈ (01). The complementarity
between the commercialization capital and the invention quality implies that a higher quality of
the invention will produce a higher marginal product of capital at all levels of capital. As a result
some inventors may have insuﬃcient assets to fully fund the capital investment. Following Evans
and Jovanovic (1989), we consider that inventors can borrow against their assets to fund capital
investment. If  , the inventor is a net borrower, and ( − ) is the amount he repays at
the end of the period. An inventor with assets  will be able to borrow an amount up to (−1)
and invest up to  ≤ ,9 where 1 Whenever the optimal capital investment is higher than
the inventor’s borrowing capacity the inventor will be liquidity constrained.
If the invention is commercialized with a partner, the capital is leveraged by (), the partner’s
ability. The partner may also provide ﬁnancing beyond what can be borrowed based on wealth
to release an inventor’s liquidity constraint. The joint proﬁts then are   = () + ( −
) − .10 We constrain () ≥ 1 indicating that partners do not reduce productivity. For
7In an extended version one may separately introduce the inventor’s entrepreneurial ability. Here,  can be
considered representing also the inventor’s ability. In the empirical analysis we analyze the robustness of results by
allowing entrepreneurial ability to vary in some speciﬁcations.
8We abstract away from deciding on the number of partners; our stylized partner could therefore also be in-
terpreted as the endowments of a set of partners. We also disregard the case where the inventor directly sells
the invention. Our simpliﬁed model holds for the majority of partnerships since most partnerships are between
two individuals. For example, Ruef, Aldrich, and Carter (2003) shows that in the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial
Dynamics, out of 421 start-ups with partners, 74% had two members, 13% had three members, 7% four, and 5%
had ﬁve or more. A slightly expanded version of our model would characterize selection of multiple partners by
setting the opportunity cost to n where n is the number of partners.
9Note that  =  +(  − 1)
10Inventors are assumed to form a partnership rather than hi r i n ge m p l o y e e sb e c a u s ei ti sh a r dt ow r i t ee m p l o y m e n t
contracts when commercialization eﬀorts (while observed by the contractual parties) are not veriﬁable by a third
party (Grossman and Hart, 1986).
7simplicity we hereon reduce notation to  for partner ability, although () is some function of
a vector of human and social capital. Partners’ ability contribute towards a higher productivity
of capital for a given level of invention quality.11 An additional beneﬁt of a partnership is that
business partners can contribute external ﬁnancing. The parameter  is a sunk cost to form a
business partnership. We interpret it as the partner’s opportunity cost to join the partnership.
For simplicity, we assume that invention quality, inventor wealth, and the partner’s ability are
observable by the two parties.12 This assumption together with an inelastic supply of labor
implies that there will be no use of convertible features in the contract between the inventor and
the business partner.13 These assumptions were motivated by the distinctive objectives and modes
of operation of informal venture capital. Informal venture capital investors, generally, do not rely
on traditional control mechanisms, such as board control, staging or contractual provisions. They
typically make only a few investments at a time and tend to invest substantially smaller amounts
than VCs, invest their savings on their own, and they often spend time ’hands-on’ in the business.
In addition, we assume that partners are suﬃciently ﬁnancially endowed that partnerships can
reach the unconstrained level of capital investment that maximizes proﬁts. This ﬁnal assumption
simpliﬁes the analysis considerably.
An inventor chooses to form a business partnership if the proﬁtf r o mt h a t ,  is higher
than the proﬁt from a solo-entrepreneurship,  , assuming contracting is eﬃcient.14 Proﬁts are
evaluated at the capital investments that maximizes their respective proﬁts subject to liquidity
constraints. Eﬃcient contracting implies that as long as forming a partnership is mutually beneﬁ-
cial, our results do not depend on how proﬁts are split. If the inventor is not liquidity constrained
11An alternative interpretation is that partners leverage the quality of the invention. Both interpretations are
possible, adopting the alternate does not change the comparative statics that follow.
12Allowing for asymmetric information in our model at the time of partnership formation will not change the
qualitative results concerning selection on invention quality and demand for ﬁnancing.
13A more general framework including some elements such as persistent asymmetric information, unobserved
eﬀort, and multiple rounds of ﬁnancing —albeit without selection— has been analyzed in Chemmanur and Chen
(2006) and Repullo and Suarez (2004). Both papers study the double-sided moral hazard problem on the part
of both the investor and the entrepreneur. The optimal contracts in both models predict the use of convertible
features either to provide incentives to the entrepreneur (Repullo and Suarez, 2004) or the investor (Chemmanur
and Chen, 2006). Interestingly, Chemmanur and Chen’s analysis predicts that angel ﬁnancing contracts are less
likely to incorporate convertible features compared to formal VC contracts.
14Eﬃcient contracting implies that we are agnostic about how the surplus is split. That is, the incentive to form
a partnership for the inventor will be the same independently on how the surplus is split. There is no strictly
preferred way to determine the division of surplus and, while it has sometimes been derived from an explicit
bargaining game, it has been more common to assume that each party’s share of the surplus is given exogenously.
For example, in one well-known model of teamwork production, Kremer (1993, p. 585) simply notes that “the
division of a ﬁrm’s output among its heterogeneous workers [is] determined by a complex bargaining problem.” Our
model could consider potential ineﬃciencies associated with moral hazard problems of partnership production (see
Holmstrom, 1982), but since we have no data on partnership structure, predictions from such an extension would
not be testable. Instead, we assume that all ineﬃciencies associated with partnerships are scaled by the parameter
.
8(i.e.,  ≤ 
()(1−))15 the diﬀerence between   and   represents extra proﬁts associated
with a higher productivity of capital as a result of the partner’s ability. Unconstrained part-
nerships are formed exclusively to add human and/or social capital. If the inventor is liquidity
constrained, the extra proﬁts represent both higher productivity of capital (whenever partner’s
ability is provided) and the eﬀect of relaxing liquidity constraints, increasing the commercializa-
tion investment to its optimal level. These partnerships may be formed to add human and/or
social capital, or to obtain external ﬁnancing.
Figure 1: The Decision to Partner as a function of A and Q given ﬁxed inventor assets Z
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The partnership optimal decisions are illustrated in Figure 1 where invention quality ()i s
plotted against partner ability () for a given level of assets.16 The ﬁgure is divided into two
main regions — solo-entrepreneurship and partnership — by the threshold b (),w h e r eb  is
the value of  where   =  . Given a partner’s ability and the inventor’s assets, the inventor
will form a partnership if and only if the invention quality is above the threshold b (),w h i c h
implies that   .T h e t h r e s h o l db () decreases with the partner’s ability indicating




1− is the level of invention quality such that the inventor’s commercialization investment





See appendix for more details.
16The formal proofs of the following results are in the appendix.
9to be indiﬀerent between commercializing the invention with or without a partner.
A prediction that follows from this model is that when invention quality increases, the prob-
ability to form a partnership increases. This is because a higher invention quality facilitates the
amortization of the sunk costs to form a partnership. As a result, we should expect a positive cor-
relation between pre-partnership invention quality and inventions commercialized in partnerships.
A second prediction from the model is that the higher the ability of the partner that the inventor
meets the higher the probability of partnership. This implies that conditional on a partnership
being formed, the average ability of a partner should be strictly higher than the ability of the
average potential partner. Both predictions are probabilistic because there is a probability of
meeting a partner and there is ex ante uncertainty about the ability of the partner. These predic-
tions have important implications for the estimation of value added. There will be selection into
partnerships based on invention quality, and there will be selection into partnerships based on the
partner’s ability. Estimation of the marginal impact of the partner’s ability on commercialization
success must therefore control for the quality of the invention, and can only be interpreted as an
average treatment-on-the-treated eﬀect (Heckman, 1979).
The region with partnership formation is further divided into two areas by the threshold
b () — partnerships with ﬁnancing and partnerships without ﬁnancing. b deﬁnes the quality
level above which the inventor is liquidity constrained. The threshold b  decreases with the
partner’s ability indicating that the higher the partner’s ability the lower is the invention quality
above which an inventor is liquidity constrained. Partnerships with ability but without ﬁnancing
are located in the region above b  and below b  in Figure 1. These partnerships do not require
a partner for ﬁnancing reasons, but the partner’s contribution of human and/or social capital
outweighs the cost of partnering. There are two characteristics about these partnerships that are
worth noticing. First, partnerships with ability but without ﬁnancing exist only for intermediate
levels of invention quality; for higher levels of invention quality there will always be external
ﬁnancing as the inventor’s liquidity constraint will eventually bind; and for lower levels of invention
quality a partnership may only be proﬁtable when external ﬁnancing releases liquidity constraints
(inventor’s assets are low) and therefore partners will provide both ability and ﬁnancing. Second,
for the intermediate levels of quality, decreasing invention quality further may temporarily increase
the proportion of partnerships with no ﬁnancing while the overall proportion of partnerships may
decrease, as can be seen in Figure 1. The explanation is that the relative beneﬁt of the contribution
of partners’ ability holds up better than the drop in value added of external ﬁnancing as invention
quality diminishes.
Partnerships with both ability and ﬁnancing are characterized by inventions that range from
10high to low levels of invention quality. The partnerships with higher level of invention quality
involve external ﬁnancing because the inventor’s liquidity constraints are more likely to bind.
Instead, partnerships of low invention quality may only be proﬁtable when inventor’s assets are
low and therefore partners must provide both ability and ﬁnancing. If the demand for exter-
nal ﬁnancing originates from these lower quality inventions, the selection eﬀect on demand for
ﬁnancing will be less. These results suggest that to assess the importance of selection on demand
for ﬁnancing we may compare the mean invention quality in partnerships with both ability and
ﬁnancing against partnerships with ability but without ﬁnancing. If the mean quality in partner-
s h i p sw i t hb o t ha b i l i t ya n dﬁnancing is lower than the quality in partnerships with ability but
without ﬁnancing, then the proportion of inventors with suﬃciently low assets in the economy
will be large and the selection on demand for ﬁnancing will be less.
Finally, it is possible that if invention quality is suﬃciently high a partner without ability may
join simply to release credit constraints. Partnerships that provide only ﬁnancing are located at
the top left corner of Figure 1.
To summarize this discussion, there will be three types of partnerships; those where partners
only bring ﬁnancing, those where partners provide both ability and ﬁnancing, and those where
partners only provide ability. A ﬁrst testable prediction of the model was that when invention
quality increases, the probability to form a partnership increases. This implies selection on quality.
The second prediction was that the higher the ability of the partner that the inventor meets the
higher the probability of partnership. This implies selection on partner ability. A third prediction
was that the probability to form a partnership to obtain ﬁnancing increases with invention quality.
This prediction implies selection on demand for ﬁnancing. However, we also showed that the
mean invention quality in partnerships with both ability and ﬁnancing may be lower than for
partnerships with ability and without ﬁnancing. This could happen if the proportion of inventors
with suﬃciently low assets in the economy is large and would imply that selection on demand for
ﬁnancing would be less.17
17If we for the moment assume uniform distributions of assets and invention quality in the inventor population,
and a uniform distribution of partner ability, the most likely type of partnership is that where partners bring both
ﬁnancing and abilities. However, skew or bimodal distributions of quality, assets or ability in the economy may
temper this prediction. An additional conclusion from the model is that the pool of solo-entrepreneurs will consists
of two types; those with low quality inventions which are not liquidity constrained and those with higher quality
which are liquidity constrained but which did not ﬁnd a suitable partner. The fraction of liquidity constrained
solo-entrepreneurs as well as the fraction of partnershipsv a r i e sa c r o s se c o n o m i e sa saf u n c t i o no ft h ep r e p o n d e r a n c e
of potential partners (with ﬁnancing and abilities) in the economy, and the distribution of invention quality and
assets in the inventor population.
113D a t a
We focus our empirical analysis on a sample of independent inventors; that is, individuals who
decide to develop inventions outside their regular employment duties. Many inventors may not
have great entrepreneurial or business skills and may lack the ﬁnancial capital necessary to com-
mercialize their inventions. Further, they may lack the beneﬁts of working in a large organization
in terms of access to a multitude of internal resources such as a lab, funding, skilled colleagues,
and an established marketing and distribution network. They may thus ﬁnd it particularly useful
to have others join them in their commercialization eﬀorts. A construction business, corner store,
personal service, or restaurant (the most common start-ups), may not require large up-front in-
vestments, but commercializing new products involve using signiﬁcant business skills and capital
investments. Studying independent inventors should thus likely provide an excellent opportunity
to examine the role of informal venture capital, partnership mechanisms, and their outcomes.
However, it is costly, given their scarcity, to ﬁnd independent inventors among the general
population. To economize on search costs, we therefore use a list of independent inventors,
self-identiﬁed through their use of the services of the Canadian Innovation Centre (CIC). The
assessment results in an overall recommendation that is either positive or negative. Our sample
frame consists of inventors that had asked the CIC to evaluate their inventions between 1994
and 2001. Of these, we had current addresses for 1,770 which we contacted by surface mail in
2004. We were then able to contact 934 by telephone, and from these we obtained 830 telephone
surveys. All data except the invention evaluations are self-reported. We remove 53 partially
answered surveys and 5 observations where the IP was sold or licensed, leaving 772 observations
for analysis.18 Missing item responses were imputed ﬁve times assuming data were Missing At
Random (MAR) using a switching regression approach described in van Buuren et al. (1999),
where missing data were randomly replaced conditional on observed data and survey structure.
Means, coeﬃcient estimates and standard errors are subsequently computed over ﬁve complete
datasets using the formulae in Little and Rubin (1987, equations 12.17—12.20).19 Pseudo-2’s are
provided for one of the ﬁve samples as an indication of absolute levels.
The data primarily contains information on pre-CIC research and development (R&D) expen-
18For survey details see Astebro, Jeﬀrey, and Adomdza (2007).
19In multiple imputation, missing values for any variable are predicted using existing values from other variables.
The predicted values replace missing values, resulting in a full data set. This process is performed multiple times.
Standard statistical analysis is performed on each imputed data set. Results are then combined. Multiple imputation
restores not only the natural variability in the missing data, but also incorporates the uncertainty caused by
estimating missing data. Uncertainty is accounted for by creating diﬀerent versions of the missing data and observing
the variability between imputed data sets. For a further introduction to multiple missing data imputation see
Graham and Hofer (2000).
12ditures, pre-partnership invention quality assessment by the CIC, post-CIC commercialization
expenditures, a dummy for the creation of a partnership to commercialize the invention, three
non-exclusive dummies for the type of capital partners bring (human capital, social capital, and
ﬁnancing), the amount of external ﬁnancial capital, whether or not the invention was commer-
cialized, total commercialization revenues, and year and industry classiﬁcation codes. There are
also sundry inventor and invention characteristics in the survey that we employ when computing
partnership propensity scores.
3.1 Summary statistics
The modal inventor age is 45-54 and the modal educational attainment is high school, although
about 26% of the inventors had some professional or graduate education. Only 16% of the in-
ventors reported they were unemployed, home-makers, retired, disabled, or on sick leave during
the time that they were developing their focal invention. Most (58%) were full-time employees,
while 32% were self-employed when developing their invention (multiple answers possible). To
understand the composition of the inventor sample better, we drew a comparison sample from
the general Canadian population.20
While the identiﬁcation of inventors relies on a speciﬁc, focal, invention submitted to the CIC
it does not imply that the individuals are predominantly one-shot inventors. To the contrary,
the sample is dominated by long-term serial inventors. Fifty-three percent of them had spent six
or more years developing inventions, and 75% had worked on more than one invention. Eleven
percent developed the invention as part of their normal duties at work. Twenty-six percent were
stimulated by something at work, a majority of which (73%) were not required to innovate at
work. Descriptions of some inventions reveal most to be “user-driven”. The sources of invention
are thus quite varied.
With regards to the inventions, 21% were rated as of high quality by the CIC and given a
positive recommendation, suitable to develop further at least as a part-time eﬀort. The other
20We queried a sample of 300 Canadians from the general population based on sampling quotas for province,
work experience, and gender, to reﬂect similarities in the aggregate with the inventors on these three variables. The
combined samples contains unusually high fractions reporting that they are or have been self-employed (63 percent),
or have owned a business (60 percent). The rates of entrepreneurship are much higher for the inventor sample than
for the general population sample: 72 percent of the inventor sample report current or prior self-employment,
compared with 43 percent of the general population sample; 67 percent of the inventor sample report current or
prior business ownership compared with 43 percent of the general population sample. Overall, the average number
of businesses that have been owned is 1.20; again, the ﬁgure is much higher for the inventor sample (1.49) than
for the general population sample (0.69). Note also that individuals in the more entrepreneurial inventor sample
are more likely to have come from an entrepreneurial family. The two samples otherwise do not diﬀer much on
comparable variables such as age, education, experience, gender, marital status, managerial experience and business
experience. For further details see Astebro and Thompson (2011).
1379% were deemed of low quality and inventors were recommended to stop further development.
Most numerous were sports/leisure products (28%), followed by 16% security or safety appli-
cations, 14% automotive, 14% medical or health, and 13% which had environmental or energy
applications. Inventions involving high technology (9%) and industrial equipment (14%) were
also relatively frequent. Successful consumer-oriented inventions included a new milk container
design, a washable sanitary pad, and a home security light timer that imitates typical use. Other
inventions had business applications. These inventions included an aligner and printer for pho-
tographic proofs, a tractor-trailer fairing that enhances fuel eﬃciency, a re-usable plug to insert
in wooden hydroelectric poles after testing for rot, and a computerized and mechanically inte-
grated tree harvester. Thus, the inventions varied substantially in technological complexity and
market potential. The median invention development eﬀort was performed in 1997, and 95% of
respondents had attempted to develop their focal invention before 2003.
The pre-commercialization investments in the inventions reveal to be far larger than in the
ordinary start-up. For example, the 1992 Characteristics of Business Owners database report that
the majority of U.S. start-ups (approximately 60%) were started or acquired with no cash outlay
or with less than $5,000 (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1997.) In contrast, the average R&D
investment for the inventors is approximately Cdn. $22,500 and the additional commercialization
investment is another Cdn. $24,800 (2003 values). Nevertheless, investments in these projects at
the same time appears somewhat less than those undertaken by ’business angel networks’. For
example, Wiltbank and Boeker (2007) report the average investment size per project (including
follow-on investments) by business angel networks to be $191,000 (median investor contribution
$50,000), while Wiltbank (2009) report an average investor contribution of £42,000. Note that the
samples of projects with business angel investors are constructed conditioned on business angel
investments being positive, while our sample does not have this restriction.
4 Partnerships and the commercialization of inventions
We ﬁrst report some descriptive statistics on partnerships and solo-entrepreneurs. In approxi-
mately 21% of the projects the inventor was joined by someone to commercialize the invention.
The primary reason for the inventor to create a partnership was to obtain human capital (65%),
followed by obtaining ﬁnancing (51%), and social capital (42%).21 Figure 1 suggested four po-
21We asked the inventor "Did you ever team up with other people trying to commercialize the invention?", if
yes, we further inquired: "Why did you team up with other people?" with the following options read: "You needed
to have your skills complemented by their skills", "They had contacts that were useful", "You needed the capital
they provided", "They had resources that were useful (land, equipment, plant)" and "Other". In analysis the two
categories prior to "other" are collapsed into one. The questions imply that there is some form of matching where
14tential choices for an inventor: no partnership; with only ﬁnancing provided; partnership with
ﬁnancing and ability provided; and ﬁnally partnerships with only ability provided by the partner.
Table 1 can be used to compute the proportions of these outcomes. As stated above, 79% are
without a partnership. Among the partnerships, in 16% of the cases there were only ﬁnancing
provided, in 51% there were both ﬁnancing and ability provided by partners, and in 45% of the
partnerships there were only ability provided.
T h ef a c tt h a tas i g n i ﬁcant number of inventors are joined by someone to commercialize their
invention suggests that there may be beneﬁts to partnership. Indeed, we ﬁnd that working with
partners is positively correlated with the probability that inventions are commercialized. Table 1B
shows that partnerships have a probability of commercialization of 0.30, which is about ﬁve times
larger than that of projects run by solo-entrepreneurs (0.06). The presence of partners is also
positively correlated with revenues. Projects run by solo-entrepreneurs had mean present value
of revenues of $24,196; mean revenues from projects run by partnerships were approximately ten
times as much; $232,397. While solo entrepreneurship dominates the data there appears to be
enough variation to examine partnership selection mechanisms and beneﬁts. Importantly, not all
partners provide ﬁnancing indicating a potential value added eﬀect through human and/or social
capital.
4.1 Selection into partnership
Selection on invention quality The theoretical model predicts a positive correlation be-
tween pre-partnership invention quality and the probability of partnership formation. To in-
vestigate selection on invention quality, we classify inventions into two categories; high quality
inventions will be those with a CIC positive assessment, the rest of the inventions are deemed
of low quality. It is immediately apparent that partners are more likely to join inventors with
high quality inventions, as shown in Table 1B. Partnerships are twice more likely to have high
quality inventions than solo-entrepreneurs, 35 percent versus 18 percent. Stated diﬀerently, 34
percent of inventions rated as high quality were eventually joined by a partner, while only 17%
of inventions with low quality were joined by a partner. We have also classiﬁed the quality of
the inventions using the inventor’s own research and development (R&D) expenditures prior to
the CIC assessment and formation.22 Partners were more likely to join inventors with higher
R&D expenditures. The average R&D expenditures by the inventors that were eventually joined
by partners was $90,364; the solo-entrepreneurs spent on average $4,725. To control for varying
the partner provides something which the inventor does not have.
22We separate between the idea creation and commercialization phase by the date of the CIC assessment.
15Table 1: Commercialization, Invention Quality, R and D Expenditures and Revenues by Solo-
entrepreneurs and Teams.
The sample consists of 772 inventions from inventors that had asked the Canadian In-
novation Center (CIC) to evaluate their inventions between 1994 and 2001. The table
is divided into three parts. Panel A describes the percentage of inventions that were
commercialized in partnerships, and the percentages of partnerships where partners pro-
vided only ﬁnancing, both ﬁnancing and ability, or only ability. Panel B presents char-
acteristics of inventions commercialized by partnerships and solo-entrepreneurs. These
characteristics are: the percentage of inventions with a positive CIC assessment; the
probability of commercialization; and the means of the R and D expenditures, the
commercialization investment, and the commercialization revenues. Panel C presents
characteristics of projects conditional on commercialization. All data are in Cdn 2003
dollars. Each missing item response has been imputed ﬁve times following van Buuren
et al. (1999). Means are computed using the formulae in Little and Rubin (1987).
A. Percentage of projects with partnerships and contributions by partners
Percentage partnerships (%) 21.0
Contributions among partnerships (%)
Only ﬁnancing 15.6
Both ﬁnancing and human/social capital 35.6
Only human/social capital 45.6




positive CIC review (%) 21.5 35.5 17.8
Mean R&D expenditures ($)
by inventor prior to the CIC review 22,518 90,364 4,725
Mean commercialization
investment ($) 24,823 70,690 12,792
Mean commercialization
revenues ($) 67,432 232,397 24,196
Probability of commercialization (%) 10.9 29.9 5.9
C. Characteristics of projects conditional on commercialization
Percentage with 49.3 55.0 41.7
p o s i t i v eC I Cr e v i e w( % )
Mean R&D expenditures ($) 166,009 282,354 10,882
by inventor prior to the CIC review
Mean commercialization
investment ($) 110,343 169,732 31,158
Mean commercialization
revenues ($) 619,739 776,238 411,073
16Table 2: Probit Regression Analysis of Partnership
The sample consists of 772 inventions from inventors that had asked the Canadian Inno-
vation Center (CIC) to evaluate their inventions between 1994 and 2001. The dependent
variable is partnership, a dummy variable taking the value 1 if an innovation was com-
mercialized as a partnership, 0 otherwise. The independent variables are "Positive", a
dummy variable taking the value 1 if the CIC assesment was positive, 0 otherwise; and
"R and D expenditures", the natural logarithm of R and D expenditures. All data are in
Cdn 2003 dollars. All regressions include dummy variables controlling for the project’s
industry, and the year the invention was assessed by the CIC. Standard errors in paren-
thesis. ***, ** or * mean the coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at the 1 percent, 5 percent, or
10 percent level, respectively. Each missing item response has been imputed ﬁve times
following van Buuren et al. (1999). Coeﬃcients and standard errors are computed using
the formulae in Little and Rubin (1987).
Parameter estimates of eﬀects of invention quality
Positive 0.397*** 0.211
(0.130) (0.142)
R&D expenditures 0.080*** 0.071***
(0.016) (0.017)
Pseudo 2(%) 0.06 0.08 0.08
N 772 772 772
capital requirements by technology and for varying costs of capital we include industry and year
dummies in a regression of the probability of formation on invention quality. Estimates survive the
inclusion of these industry and year controls (see Table 2). The Table also reveals that inventors’
R&D expenditures were correlated with the CIC assessments.
S e l e c t i o no nd e m a n df o rﬁnancing An additional reason for why partners join inventors
is to provide external ﬁnancing. The model provides several predictions concerning the interplay
of external ﬁnancing and formation. A ﬁrst prediction is that the probability to form a partnership
to obtain ﬁnancing increases with invention quality. Using the same quality indicators and controls
as before as predictors, Table 3 presents Probit regressions with a dummy = 1 if a partnerships
was formed to obtain ﬁnancing, and zero otherwise. The table shows support for this prediction.
It appears that most of the invention quality variation that determines partnership ﬁnancing is
best captured with pre-partnership R&D expenditures.
Another prediction refers to the invention quality where partners provide both ability and
ﬁnancing versus the quality where partners provide only ability. According to our theory, partner-
ships with both ability and ﬁnancing can have lower average invention quality than partnerships
with only ability only if the proportion of inventors with low assets is high. Data show that
partnerships with both ability and ﬁnancing indeed have a lower proportion of positive CIC as-
17Table 3: Probit Regression Analysis of Partnership with Financing
The sample consists of 772 inventions from inventors that had asked the Canadian
Innovation Center (CIC) to evaluate their inventions between 1994 and 2001. The
dependent variable is partnership with ﬁnancing; a dummy variable taking the value
1 if an innovation was commercialized by a partnership with ﬁnancing, 0 otherwise.
The independent variables are Positive; a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the CIC
assesment was positive, 0 otherwise; and the natural logarithm of R and D expenditures.
All data are in Cdn 2003 dollars. All regressions include dummy variables controlling
for the project’s industry, and the year the invention was assessed by the CIC. Standard
errors in parenthesis. ***, ** or * mean the coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at the 1 percent, 5
percent, or 10 percent level, respectively. Each missing item response has been imputed
ﬁve times following van Buuren et al. (1999). Coeﬃcients and standard errors are
computed using the formulae in Little and Rubin (1987).
Parameter estimates of eﬀects of invention quality
Positive 0.125 -0.029
(0.152) (0.165)
R&D expenditures 0.055*** 0.057***
(0.019) (0.021)
Pseudo 2(%) 0.05 0.06 0.06
N 772 772 772
sessments (30%) and R&D expenditures (Cdn $18,775) than partnerships with only ability (41%
and Cdn $177,025, respectively). The diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant (t-tests of diﬀerences
in proportions and means are 3.32 and 3.60, respectively.) This result suggests that the proportion
of inventors with low assets may be large. It implies that selection on demand for ﬁnancing may
be less since the demand for ﬁnancing may be primarily from lower quality inventions. Once we
analyze value added we can test additional predictions relating to the demand for ﬁnancing.
5 The value added of partners’ ability











 as a latent variable indicating commercialization success, and
∗
 =  +  +  +  +  + 
where  is the log of commercialization revenues;  is unobserved (to the econometrician) in-
vention quality;  is a dummy that equals one if a partnership was formed to commercialize
18invention ;  represents regressors that vary across inventions, and  is a normally distributed
zero mean residual component. The terms  and  correspond to industry and CIC application
year eﬀects as implemented by a set of dummy variables, and  captures the eﬀect of partner’s
ability on the commercialization revenues conditional on a partnership being formed.23 We use
the log form to allow for multiplicative eﬀects of inputs as posited by our theoretical model.
Table 4 reports the eﬀect of forming a partnership and control variables on the latent variable
∗
 . We use a Tobit model as there are a large number of inventions that are never commercialized
and have zero revenues.24 To provide intuition, we use a standard decomposition technique of the
coeﬃcient  into the marginal eﬀect on the probability of commercialization, and the marginal
eﬀect on expected log revenues, both estimated at sample means (see e.g. McDonald and Moﬃtt,
1980).25 The ﬁrst column (Model 1) shows the estimated coeﬃcient for the partnership dummy
controlling for industry and year eﬀect. Joint t-tests indicate that industry dummies (t=1.74)
and year dummies (t=1.70) are only marginally signiﬁcant. After controlling for industry and
year dummies the size of  is 15.25. Taking this value and evaluating the marginal eﬀects of
partnership at the mean of the sample imply that an invention project run as a partnership has
approximately a 0.22 greater probability of commerc i a l i z a t i o nt h a no n er u nb yas o l o - e n t r e p r e n e u r ,
and its expected revenues are eight times higher than a solo-entrepreneur project. (Since the
controls are only marginally signiﬁcant the gross diﬀerences in Table 1B are quite similar; 0.24
and 9.6, respectively.)
The positive correlation between commercialization success and partnership formation has
to be interpreted with caution. We previously showed that partners are more likely to join
inventions of higher quality and that the demand for ﬁnancing depends on invention quality and
thus also determines partnership formation. Both ﬁndings indicate that the partnership coeﬃcient
in Column 1 is endogenously determined and likely upwards biased.
We therefore add two proxies to account for selection based on invention quality: the CIC
assessment and the log of R&D expenditures. The second column in Table 4 (Model 2) shows
23See Proposition 4 in the appendix for proof that  must be interpreted as a treatment-on-the-treated eﬀect.
24We also experimented with a Heckman selection speciﬁcation, but we could not ﬁnd a variable that could be
reasonably assumed to aﬀect the probability to commercialize but not revenues conditional on commercialization.
Without an exclusion restriction estimations were very unstable or did not converge.
25Consider the following Tobit model. Let the dependent variable be  = 
∗ (if 
∗  0)a n d =0(if 
∗ ≤ 0),a n d
the latent variable 
∗





where  is a regressor of interest,  is a matrix of the sample means of the regressors,  is the corresponding Tobit
estimated coeﬃcient of the regressor ,a n dΦ is the cdf of the standard normal distribution. If  is a dummy,
the marginal eﬀect is the diﬀerence between the diﬀerence of the predicted values of of the dummy evaluated at
the sample mean of the rest of the regressors. Because our dependent variable is the log of revenues, the marginal
eﬀect of partnership in revenues can be approximated by exponentiating the marginal eﬀect of partnership on the
log of revenues.
19that the eﬀect of partnership formation on expected commercialization success then decreases
from 15.25 to 11.68, a 23 percent reduction. The test indicates that there is clear selection on
project quality into partnerships. However, the partnership coeﬃcient still remains signiﬁcant
and large. At the sample means, partnerships are associated with an increase in the probability
of commercialization of 16 percentage points, and an increase in the expected revenues by a factor
of 3.5. The large magnitudes of these eﬀects indicate additional partnership eﬀects.
Two additional mechanisms may explain the remaining partnership eﬀe c t–t h er o l eo fc o m -
mercialization investments and external ﬁnancing. Our theory suggests that optimal commercial-
ization investments should increase whenever the partner’s ability increases the productivity of
capital. If partner’s ability increases the productivity of capital, controlling for the commercial-
ization investment should account for the part of the partnership eﬀect that causes an increase in
the optimal investment level. In addition, the amount of external ﬁnancing provided by partners
should capture the partnership eﬀect on revenues from relaxing liquidity constraints. Unfortu-
nately, due to survey structure we cannot simultaneously identify these two eﬀects.26 We therefore
run two regressions where we ﬁrst analyze the impact of commercialization investments and then
analyze the impact of external ﬁnancing.
In Model 3 of Table 4 we analyze the eﬀect of commercialization investments. The third column
adds the natural logarithm of post-partnership commercialization investments; the sum of all cash
provided both by the inventor and external ﬁnanciers to commercialize the invention after the
formation of a partnership. The results show that the commercialization investment is aﬀected
by partners contributing ability because the partnership coeﬃcient declines signiﬁcantly (35.5%)
when adding the commercialization investment. But while the introduction of commercialization
investment reduces the partnership coeﬃcient considerably, the partnership eﬀect remains positive
and statistically signiﬁcant. For instance, evaluating the eﬀects of partnerships at the mean of the
sample, partnerships increase the probability of commercialization by 8 percentage points, and
increase expected revenues by 65%. Another noteworthy results is that both the quality indicators
diminish in size and signiﬁcance once we control for commercialization investment. The reason is
that the commercialization investment is also endogenous to project quality: optimal investments
increase with invention quality.
26The survey enquired: 1. First, we would like to know how much money was spent on developing XX. Include all
costs for product development, marketing research, making of prototypes, etc. How much did you spend before you
contacted the CIC for an evaluation? 2. How much did you spend after you contacted the CIC for an evaluation?
3. I will now read a list of sources of funds that you may have used to pay for the costs of developing your invention.
Please tell me for each source whether you have actually used it or not. 4. Consider the total amount of money
you have spent on this invention so far. How large a proportion of this amount was your own money? These data
a l l o wu st oi d e n t i f ye i t h e rt h ee ﬀect of commercialization investment (using question 2) or external ﬁnancing (using
question 4).
20To examine whether inventors are liquidity constrained and the degree to which partners
relax these liquidity constraints, in Table 5 we separate between the natural logarithm of the
inventor’s cash contribution and the natural logarithm of the sum of all cash contributions by all
external ﬁnanciers.27 A ﬁrst result from this analysis is that the size of the coeﬃcient for external
ﬁnancing is almost four times lower than the coeﬃcient for own ﬁnancing in Model 3. This result
is consistent with the idea that inventors are capital constrained. If they were not constrained the
coeﬃcients for internal and external ﬁnancing should be equal.28 Thus, selection into partnerships
to release liquidity constraintsi sl i k e l yt oo c c u r .E x t e r n a lﬁnancing is also positively correlated
with the partnership eﬀect, but not very much. Quantitatively, the partnership coeﬃcient is
reduced from 10.28 (in model 2) to 9.26 (in model 3), a reduction by 10%. The results indicate
that partners may often not be the main external ﬁnancier.
Our theoretical model assumed that labor supply was inelastic both for the inventor and the
partner. But it is possible that labor may be supplied elastically. The inventor may for example
be trading oﬀ time in the venture with working part-time as an employee and the partner may be
investing in several ventures at the same time. We therefore relax the assumption of inelastic labor
supply in Model 4. In particular, we inquired about the sum of the number of hours provided by
the inventor and all partners post CIC evaluation to commercialize the invention. Including the
log of this number (with log of zero hours set to zero) will allow us to approximately isolate partner
ability from hours of input by the partner. Results are reported in Model 4 in Tables 4 and 5.
Controlling for labor inputs, the partnership coeﬃcient drops by 0% in Table 4 and 5% in Table
5. The low conditional correlation between the partnership dummy and total hours indicate
that it is the inventor whom perform the majority of commercialization eﬀorts, and that the
main contribution by partners is skills, rather than hours. However, the magnitudes of the other
parameters generally drop, indicating that labor eﬀorts are positively correlated with invention
quality, total commercialization investments, and the amount of external ﬁnancing. Nevertheless,
the partnership coeﬃcient remains signiﬁcant and large.
Whatever is left of the partnership coeﬃcient after accounting for selection on quality, com-
mercialization investment, labor supply, and external ﬁnancing can be attributed to the partner’s
ability, but as well to measurement error and model mis-speciﬁcation. In the next two subsec-
tions we therefore attempt to further control for selection on inventor-invention characteristics,
selection on unobservables and measurement error to isolate the eﬀect of partner ability on com-
27A l lo t h e r sm a yb ef o re x a m p l eb a n k s ,f a m i l y ,f r i e n d s ,b u s i n e s sp a r t n e r s ,u n i v e r s i t i e sa sw e l lt h eg o v e r n m e n t .
Due to survey structure we could not separate the investments between these external suppliers of capital.
28This result is consistent with the ﬁnding that smaller and younger ﬁrms have higher growth-cash ﬂow sensitiv-
ities than larger and more mature ﬁrms (see e.g. Fazzari, Hubbard, and Peterson, 2000).
21mercialization success.
5.1 Accounting for selection on observables
We start by controlling for selection into partnerships on observable inventor characteristics using
a propensity-score weighted model described by Hirano, Imbens, and Ridder (2003).29 Woolridge
(2007) discuss a related approach, but Hirano et al.’s method may produce more eﬃcient estimates.
We estimate the propensity to form a partnership with logistic regression using as predictors
the previously used variables: Positive, pre-partnership R&D expenditures, industry and year
dummies, as well as a range of additional pre-determined pre-partnership inventor and invention
characteristics to calibrate the propensity to form a partnership.30 The range of inventor and
invention characteristics is quite large. Matching partnership observations to non-partnership
observations with similar propensity scores we can behave as if there was random assignment to
partnerships on inventor and invention characteristics, under the condition that there is ample
partnership and non-partnership observations for each score. We examined this requirement
and deleted 48 observations where there was no common support, leaving 724 observations for
subsequent analysis. The region of common support for the score is [.02, .91], capturing the 1st
to the 99th percentile. Because there is considerable overlap in the score distributions between
partnership and non-partnership observations between the 1st to the 99th percentile the so-called
balance property is satisﬁed and we can safely rely on the scores to provide reasonable matching.
Results of the inverse propensity-score weighted Tobit are provided in Model 5. As seen, the
estimate of the partnership coeﬃcient is again reduced, indicating that there is also selection on
observable inventor and invention characteristics. The coeﬃcient however does not decrease that
much, it drops by an additional 6.3% and 9.7%, in Tables 4 and 5 respectively. Therefore, after
controlling for these selection eﬀects, the partnership coeﬃcient still remains large. The size of
29In another attempt to endogenize partnership formation we estimated an IV model with "the invention was
stimulated at work" as exogenous predictor of partnership. It seems reasonable to presume that if the stimulus
for the invention was at work it may make it easier for the inventor to ﬁnd partners, but should not necessarily
directly aﬀect returns. The variable indeed was a signiﬁcant predictor of partnership (t=2.94, p0.01) and the
J-test conﬁrmed that it was not correlated with the error term of the outcome regression (Chi-2=0.09 and 0.06,
p0.10.) Although the instrument is valid and reliable the results were not stable. This is a situation where the
instrument simply is too weakly identiﬁed.
We also experimented with including all the inventor and invention characteristics in the production function.
This produced results qualitatively similar to the ones reported in Tables 4 and 5 and were deemed to be of no
major interest. Results available on request from the corresponding author.
30We included inventor gender, marital status, age, education, work experience, managerial experience, business
experience, family business experience, years experience inventing, number of inventions developed, invention devel-
oped at work, invention stimulated at work, invention developed together with someone els e ,f u l l - t i m e ,p a r t - t i m e ,
un- or self-employed when inventing. We also included the following invention characteristics: positive, pre-team
R&D expenditures, pre-team number of hours of eﬀort, industry dummies, year dummies, and whether the fee paid
to the CIC for the review was partly subsidized by a third party.
22Table 4: Tobit Regression Analysis of Commercialization Revenues
This Table presents latent variable results from Tobit regressions. The dependent vari-
able is the natural logarithm of commercialization revenues. The independent variables
are; partnership: a dummy variable =1 if an inventor formed a partnership to commer-
cialize the innovation and 0 otherwise; partner with ability is a dummy =1 if the inventor
formed a partnership and the partner contributed human and/or social capital and 0
otherwise; partner without ability but with ﬁnancing is a dummy variable =1 if the in-
ventor formed a partnership and the partner contribute ﬁnancing but did not contribute
neither human nor social capital; Positive, is a dummy variable =1 if the CIC assesment
was positive, 0 otherwise; and R and D expenditures, and commercialization investment
are the natural logarithms of R and D expenditures and commercialization investment,
respectively. All data are in Cdn 2003 dollars. All regressions include dummy variables
controlling for the project’s industry, and the year the invention was assessed by the
CIC. Standard errors in parenthesis. ***, ** or * mean the coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at
the 1 percent, 5 percent or 10 percent level, respectively. Missing item data are multiple
imputed using switching regression and assuming data are MAR. Coeﬃcient estimates
and standard errors are constructed using the formulae in Little and Rubin (1987).




Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
Partnership eﬀects
Partnership 15.25*** 11.68*** 7.54*** 7.54*** 7.06***
(2.38) (2.14) (1.94) (1.92) (1.84)
Partner with ability 7.09***
(2.01)
Partner without ability 6.52*
but with ﬁnancing (3.69)
Control variables
Positive evaluation 5.44*** 3.02 3.05 2.19 3.11
(2.15) (1.98) (1.98) (1.94) (1.98)
R&D expenditures 1.57*** 0.54* 0.48 -0.30 0.49
(0.35) (0.33) (0.33) (0.29) (0.33)
Commercialization 1.61*** 1.14*** 1.00*** 1.19***
investment (0.28) (0.31) (0.31) (0.32)
Commercialization 1.05** 1.32*** 1.01**
labor (0.44) (0.48) (0.44)
Constant -25.07*** -34.22*** -31.78*** -32.71*** -25.76*** -32.17***
(4.70) (5.43) (4.98) (5.05) (4.49) (4.98)
Sigma 14.88*** 13.37*** 11.97*** 11.81*** 9.51*** 11.87***
(1.44) (1.28) (1.13) (1.11) (0.91) (1.12)
Pseudo 2(%) 0.09 0.13 0.18 0.19 0.14 0.18
N 772 772 772 772 724 772
23the eﬀect is either 46% or 52% of the gross partnership coeﬃcient in Model 1, respectively. The
estimate from Table 4 implies that expected revenues of commercialized inventions increase by 29%
going from solo-entrepreneurship to partnership, and that the probability of commercialization
increases by 0.06 percentage points, which is a 97% percent increase over the commercialization
rate of solo-entrepreneurs, both non-trivial impacts (at the sample means of other variables).
The estimates of the impact of partnerships from Table 5 are somewhat stronger. Partnerships
increase the probability of commercialization by 0.09 percentage points, and increase expected
revenues by 49% (at the sample means of other variables).
Another result to note is that once we control for inventor and invention characteristics prior
to collaboration, the coeﬃcient for own ﬁnancing becomes negative. This may be the case because
our propensity score method uses observables that are correlated with the borrowing capacity of
the inventor.
5.2 Accounting for selection on unobservables
Finally, we address the possibility that there is inventor-invention unobserved heterogeneity and
measurement error of our identiﬁed selection eﬀe c t s .H e r ew eu t i l i z et h ef a c tt h a ts o m ep a r t n e r s
only provide ﬁnancial capital. We decompose the partnership eﬀect as follows: Partnership =
partner with ability [()] + partner without ability but with ﬁnancing [(__)]. A result
of our theoretical model is that the ﬁnancial contribution of partners exclusively aﬀect commercial-
ization investments by relaxing liquidity constraints. An implication of this identifying restriction
is that once we control for invention quality and commercialization investment, a partner that
exclusively provides ﬁnancing should not aﬀect revenues in any other way, i.e., the coeﬃcient for
(__) should be zero ( =0 ) . If the estimated coeﬃcient for (__) is zero,
b  =0 , then the coeﬃcient for () (label this b ) should represent the partner’s estimated value
added. Alternatively, if b  is positive, then there will likely be selection on unobservables and
therefore b  m a yh a v ea nu p w a r db i a s . 31
Model 6 in Tables 4 (5) replaces Partnership with dummies for () and (__).I n
Table 4 we ﬁnd that b  =7 09 (001), and b  =6 52 ( =0 08). Results in Table 5 are similar.
Therefore, it appears that b  is upwards biased due to selection on unobservables.
We proceed to separately identify the contribution of the partner’s ability from selection on
unobservables. Rather than imposing further parametric restrictions to obtain point identiﬁcation,
31Our empirical strategy may over estimate the importance of selection on unobservables whenever the partner’s
ﬁnancial investment generates additional value added beyond the partner’s contributions of business contacts (social
capital) and complementary technical skills (human capital). For instance, the partner’s ﬁnancial contribution may
generate a positive signal about the quality of the venture.
24Table 5: Tobit Regression Analysis of Commercialization Revenues with Inventor’s and Other’s
Capital
This table presents results from Tobit regressions. The dependent variable is the natural
logarithm of commercialization revenues. The independent variables are partnership, a
dummy variable =1 if an inventor formed a partnership to commercialize the innovation
and 0 otherwise; partner with ability is a dummy variable =1 if the inventor formed a
partnership and the partner contributed human and/or social capital and 0 othewise;
partner ability but with ﬁnancing is a dummy variable =1 if the inventor formed without
a partnership and the partner contribute ﬁnancing but did not contribute neither human
nor social capital; Positive, which is a dummy variable =1 if the CIC assesment was
positive, 0 otherwise; and own ﬁnancing and other ﬁnancing are the natural logarithms
of the total R and D expenditures and the total commercialization investment from the
inventor and the partner, respectively. All data are in Cdn 2003 dollars. All regressions
include dummy variables controlling for the project’s industry, and the year the invention
was assessed by the CIC. Standard errors in parenthesis. ***, ** or * mean the coeﬃcient
is signiﬁcant at the 1 percent, 5 percent, or 10 percent level, respectively. Missing item
data are multiple imputed using switching regression and assuming data are MAR.
Coeﬃcient estimates and standard errors are cosntructed using the formulae in Little
and Rubin (1987).




Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
Partnership eﬀects
Partnership 10.28*** 9.26*** 8.83*** 7.98***
(2.08) (2.08) (2.02) (1.92)
Partner with ability 8.45***
(2.10)
Partner without ability 6.66*
but with ﬁnancing (3.81)
Control variables
Positive evaluation 5.03*** 4.30** 4.29** 4.02** 4.31**
(2.06) (2.05) (2.02) (2.05) (2.03)
Own ﬁnancing 1.90*** 1.74*** 0.81** -0.56* 0.86**
(0.36) (0.36) (0.37) (0.28) (0.37)
External ﬁnancing 0.43** 0.22 0.40* 0.25
(0.22) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22)
Commercialization 1.73*** 2.13*** 1.70***
labor (0.44) (0.46) (0.44)
Constant -36.38*** -35.37*** -33.67*** -24.01*** -33.22***
(5.54) (5.42) (5.17) (4.50) (5.12)
Sigma 13.02*** 12.83*** 12.31 9.22*** 12.39***
(1.24) (1.22) (1.17) (0.88) (1.18)
Pseudo 2(%) 0.15 0.15 0.17 0.12 0.17
N 772 772 772 742 772
25we construct a lower bound for b .T h e e ﬀect of selection on unobservables may diﬀer between
partners who provide abilities and partners who only provide ﬁnancing. Indeed, Figure 1 shows
that conditional on inventor’s assets the partnerships that receive only ﬁnancing ( =1 )have
on average higher quality inventions than the rest of the partnerships. An implication of this
result is that the higher the quality of an invention, the more likely it is that a partnership with
only ﬁnancing will be formed. This is equivalent to that (())    ((__)).
The sign of this inequality allows us to calculate a lower bound of the partner’s ability:  =
b  − 0224b 32 Evaluating the right hand side of the bound at the estimated b  and b  we obtain
 =5 63 (std. err. 199000) and  =6 95 (std. err. 206000) for the estimations
presented in Table 4 and Table 5, respectively Because we can safely assume that an upper bound
for  is b  the best estimate of partner’s ability must lie in the range  ∈ (563845) The lower
bound represents a partnership coeﬃcient that is lowered from 7.54 in Model 4 to 5.63 in Model 6
of Table 4, a 25% reduction. The lower bound is 37% of the gross partnership coeﬃcient in Model
1. The lower bound remains economically meaningful. For example, the mean probability of
commercialization increases from 0.06 to 0.12 at the estimated lower bound value added, and the
eﬀect on expected revenues is a 38% increase. As the lower bound estimate is higher for results
in Table 5 we refrain from reporting those details. Note that this method returns estimates quite
similar to those from the method controlling for observed heterogeneity.
6C o n c l u s i o n
We investigated the value of informal capital for invention commercialization through business
partnership formation. Partnerships are deﬁned as when an inventor partners with someone to
obtain human capital, social capital and/or ﬁnancing to attempt commercializing an invention.
We develop a model of invention commercialization with partnership formation which reveals
three selection eﬀects. We show that partners are more likely to join inventor-inventions of high
quality because these inventions allow them to obtain a higher return as compensation for their
eﬀort. A second insight is that among all potential partners the better partners are more likely
to join inventors. Lastly, inventors with high quality inventions are more likely to be liquidity
constrained and consequently more likely to seek partners for ﬁnancing.
Raw data reveal that the eﬀect of partnerships on project outc o m e si sc o n s i d e r a b l e .T h er a t e
32Deﬁne ( )=
(())
  (()) and ( )=
((__))
  ((__)) . ( ) =   since our theoretical model
implies that the true value of  is 0, while ( ) =   −  Rearranging and using that (()) 
((__)), the lower bound 
 for   is 
 =   − (
  ((__))
  (()) )  =   − 0224  We have
replaced  (()) and  ((___)) with their sample counterparts.
26of commercialization of inventions run by partnerships is ﬁve times larger than those run by solo
entrepreneurs and revenues are almost ten times as large for partnerships as for solo entrepreneurs.
The data reveal selection into partnerships based on invention quality: 33% of inventions rated
as high quality were eventually joined by a partner, while only 17% of inventions with low quality
were joined by a partner.
To examine selection on the demand for ﬁnancing and the eﬀect of external ﬁnancing we note
that the model implies that the probability to form a partnership to obtain ﬁnancing increases with
project quality, that the marginal investment return should drop once a partner provides ﬁnancing
(indicating liquidity constraints) and that the partnership coeﬃcient should drop once controlling
for the external investment. All predictions are supported in empirical analysis. Nevertheless,
business partners do not appear to be the major source of external ﬁnancing since the partnership
eﬀect was little reduced when introducing the external investment. Data also show that invention
quality is lower when partners provide both ability and ﬁnancing than when they only provide
ability. This result suggests that the proportion of inventors with low assets may be large. It
implies that selection on demand for ﬁnancing may be less since the demand for ﬁnancing may
be primarily from inventors with lower quality inventions.
Accounting for selection, commercialization investment, external ﬁnancing, and labor hours in
Tobit analysis of commercialization revenues the remaining eﬀect of partnership formation must
be due to partners providing human and/or social capital or additional heterogeneity. We try
to isolate the eﬀect of partner ability from additional heterogeneity in two ways and ﬁnd that it
represents an increase in the probability of commercialization between 0.06 and 0.09 in both a
propensity-score-weighted speciﬁcation, and in an unobserved-heterogeneity speciﬁcation. These
are economically meaningful results as the probability of commercialization for a solo-entrepreneur
is 0.06. The estimated eﬀect of partner ability on revenues is also large, representing approximately
either a 29% or a 38% increase in expected revenues for commercialized inventions, depending
on whether we use the propensity-score-weighted or the unobserved-heterogeneity speciﬁcation.
While conditioning on a range of observables as well unobservables, these estimates must still be
interpreted as a treatment-on-the-treated eﬀect, that is, the average eﬀect of partners’ human and
social capital on project revenues for those partners selecting to join inventors. The reason is that
partners’ ability are heterogeneous and that partners with the highest ability are more likely to
join inventors.
Our paper relates to the growing work in ﬁnance which tries to estimate the value added
of venture capital to entrepreneurs. This eﬀect has been hard to isolate because VCs select on
project quality, they probably release credit constraints, and may also provide various forms of
27value added. The three eﬀects appear simultaneously when projects are ﬁnanced by VCs. In a
recent paper Kerr, Lerner, and Schoar (2010) compare the impact of obtaining and not obtaining
informal venture capital for entrepreneurs selecting to apply to two angel ﬁnancing networks who
are just above and below a funding cut-oﬀ, thereby eliminating much of explanations based on
selection on unobservables. The authors estimate the joint eﬀects of these networks releasing
liquidity constraints and providing value added, conditional on entrepreneurs applying to these
networks. We take a diﬀerent approach than Kerr et al. (2010), in that we try to separately
estimate both the selection and added value eﬀects, and we also try to disentangle the eﬀect of
partners releasing liquidity constraints from the eﬀects of their human and social capital.
Our setting is admittedly unique. We likely examine a domain where good business partners’
human and social capital may be considerably more useful than in regular start-ups such as the
mom-and-pop corner store. In this respect our sample is probably similar to that in Kerr’s et
al. (2010) study. At the same time our sample does not contain many projects that receive
VC funding and so bargaining issues related to follow-on VC ﬁnancing are probably unlikely.33
Nevertheless, our model and empirical methodology is with ease portable to other related domains
of investigation and extendable to include analysis of bargaining. Our data further exhibited
some limitations such as not linking the type of external investors with the amounts they provide,
not counting the number of partners, not collecting contractual information (we doubt there
exist much), and not providing information on the characteristics of potential partners. These
limitations provide opportunities for future research.
The policy implications that one may draw from these estimations must be very tentative given
the ﬁrst-of-a-kind nature of this work. Nevertheless, if the results hold up in future work, it would
suggest that for inventive projects, a major policy leverage to increase commercialization rates
and revenues is to lubricate the market for ﬁnding skilled partners. Furthermore, the analysis
echoes the sentiments by angel investors that they have a tough time ﬁnding suﬃcient investment
opportunities (Mason, 2009). In this study the few projects with high initial quality had twice
the participation rate by business partners than those with mediocre quality.
Finally, our work contributes to the literature on entrepreneurial choice. Lazear (2005) develop
a theory of entrepreneurs as jacks-of-all-trades where he assumes that the entrepreneur must
perform all tasks. The model we propose diﬀers from Lazear’s in that we allow individuals with
insuﬃcient skills to form partnerships to obtain the required skills rather than having to invest
in own skill development. Our model also addresses project ﬁnancing on which Lazear is silent.
33The fraction which received VC ﬁnancing was 0.8%, too small to be analyzeable in our study.
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32Appendix A: Inventor’s maximization problem
Let  () deﬁne the value of an invention of quality  with a potential partner with
ability  evaluated at the proﬁt maximizing capital investment as
 ()=m a x { ()()}
 ()=())
∗ + ( − ∗) − 
 ()=∗ + ( − ∗)
where  ∈ (01),  and  refer to solo-entrepreneurship and partnership, ∗ is the commer-
cialization investment that maximizes the value of an invention. The capital investment that






if  ≤ 
()1−
 if  
()1−
¾
which may be constrained by the inventor’s assets when the invention quality is suﬃciently
high  
()1− Note that 
()1− is the level of quality such that the commercializa-





= ) The commercialization investment that maximizes the partnership’s proﬁts






Evaluating the value of the venture at the commercialization investment that maximizes prof-
its, we obtain that the diﬀerence between the value of partnership ( ) and the value of solo-
entrepreneurship ( ) is:
 − =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨









































⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎭
An inventor and partner are indiﬀerent between forming and not forming a partnership when
 −  =0  The top equation equals the diﬀerence in proﬁts for a non-capital-constrained project
33with and without a partner. The ﬁrst bracketed term of that equation is necessarily positive and
increasing with . The second bracket is also positive and its magnitude depends on the partner’s
ability.
The second equation shows the diﬀerence in proﬁts between partnership and solo-entrepreneurship
for those inventions where an inventor is liquidity constrained. As in the top equation, the ﬁrst
two bracketed terms together represents the value added of the partner’s ability, which are in-
creasing in . The bottom term is the diﬀerence between the proﬁts of a liquidity constrained
entrepreneur which received ﬁnancing from a partner and the proﬁts for the same entrepreneur
had he not received external ﬁnancing. This diﬀerence is the contribution of a business partner-
ship exclusively formed to increase the capital investment level from the constrained investment
level,  to the unconstrained level,

 . This term is therefore positive.
Appendix B: Proofs.
Proposition 1. There exist two cut-oﬀ rules, b (()) and b (()) that describes
three potential choices that an inventor () that meets a potential partner with ability ()
can make: no partnership; partnership with ﬁnancing; and partnership with no ﬁnancing.
Proof. We start by showing that there exist a level of  such that for a ﬁxed  an inventor
is liquidity constrained. Consider two cases: the inventor meets a partner, or she does not. If
the inventor does not meet a partner, the constrained investment level is ∗ =  for 

()1− = b () Note that b () is quality level such that the solo-entrepreneur capital
investments that maximizes proﬁts are equal to the inventor’s maximum investment capacity 
If the inventor meets a partner, we have ∗ =  for  
()()1− = b (()),w h e r e
() is the partner’s ability.
The second cutoﬀ rule b (()) is the level of invention quality that makes an inventor in-
diﬀerent between forming a partnership and commercializing the invention solo. Let  ()=
max{ ()()} be the value of an invention b (()) is the invention quality
such that  (b ()) =  (b ()) There exists a unique cutoﬀ b (()).F o r
that to follow, it must be the case that e  ()= () −  () is strictly increasing
with  and that the value of e  () is positive for some  (e.g., a  suﬃciently high) and negative
for another  (e.g.,  =0 ). We will then focus our analysis on showing that e  () is increasing
in .L e tu sﬁrst consider a Q such that the inventor is liquidity constrained, i.e.,  =  Then,
as  increases, the value of   increases at a faster pace than   Next consider the inventor
not liquidity constrained. Here   increases at a faster pace than   with  because a marginal
change in  in a partnership is ampliﬁed through the partner’s ability ().T h i si sb e c a u s e()
34and  enters multiplicatively in the revenue of an innovation. Therefore, we can conclude that,
for a ﬁxed  and () there exist an invention quality level b (()) that makes an inventor
indiﬀerent between forming a partnership or working solo.
Proposition 2.F o r a ﬁxed wealth ,t h ec u t o ﬀ rule b (()) is decreasing with the
partner’s ability (). Therefore, the probability of forming a partnership increases with the
quality of the invention .
Proof: We would like to show that the liquidity cutoﬀ b (()) and the partnership cutoﬀ
b (()) are decreasing functions with the partner’s ability ().T h a tb (()) is de-
creasing with () for a ﬁxed Z is straightforward because b (()) = 
()()1− Showing
that b (()) decreases with () is somewhat more involved. For a ﬁxed  the higher ()
is the higher is the the capital investment, and so is the value of partnership   The value
of solo-entrepreneurship   does not change with (), so the diﬀerence between partnership
and entrepreneurship increases with (). Now we have to show that the higher  is, the lower
is the diﬀerent between   and  .F o r a ﬁxed (),t h el o w e r is the lower is the capital
investment and so is the value of partnership and the value of solo-entrepreneurship. However,
because ()and  enter multiplicatively in the revenue function, the value of partnership will
drop more than the value of solo-entrepreneurship. Therefore, we conclude that the higher is the
partner’s ability (), the lower is the cutoﬀ b (()).
Proposition 3. Inventors who are liquidity constrained are more likely than unconstrained
inventors to form partnerships.
Proof: To prove this result we must show that for a ﬁxed inventor’s wealth , the probability
to form a partnership is higher for an invention with quality b (()) than for the rest of
the inventions  ≤ b (()) The probability to form a partnership is the probability to meet
a partner with ability () such that b (()) Let us start with inventions where an
inventor is not liquidity constrained, i.e., the quality level is such that  ≤ b (()).H e r et h e
beneﬁt of partnership is exclusively given by the partner’s ability () and partnerships will only
be formed for inventions with invention quality above b () (see proposition 2). This implies
that when  ≤ b (()) the probability of partnership will tend to be low Alternatively, if an
inventor is liquidity constrained (i.e., b (())), the beneﬁt to form a partnership is due
to both the partner’s ability () as well as the increase in the level of capital investment from





 The two eﬀects together
are associated with a lower cutoﬀ to form a partnership b (()) than for inventions held by
inventors that were not liquidity constrained, i.e.,  ≤ b (()) Therefore, the probability
35to form a partnership is higher when the inventor is liquidity constrained than for the rest of
inventions.
Proposition 4. Conditional on a partnership being formed, the average ability of a partner
is strictly higher than the ability of the average potential partner.
Proof: Recall that () is the realization of a stochastic random variable that determines the
partner’s ability. Before meeting a partner, the ability of a potential partner is [()].F o r a
ﬁxed invention quality  and inventor’s wealth , the probability of partnership is the probability
a partner () meets a inventor with b (()) Since the function b (()) is strictly
monotone with () for a ﬁxed invention quality  we can deﬁne the probability of partnership
Pr(()  b [−1]()) where b [−1] is the inverse function of b  We want to show that
conditional on a partnership being formed, the ability of the average partner is higher than the
expected ability of a partner, i.e., [()|() ≥ b [−1]()]]  [()] This inequality holds
for all  in a partnership because () ≥ 1 Therefore, the ability of the average partner that
formed a partnership is higher than the average potential partner.
Proposition 5.F o r a ﬁxed ability ,( a )t h ec u t o ﬀ rule b () is increasing with the
inventor’s assets ; and (b) the cutoﬀ rule b () is increasing with the inventor’s assets  up
to a level of inventor’s assets where b () is independent of .
Proof: First, we show that cutoﬀ rule b () is increasing with the inventor’s assets 
Let us consider a level of invention quality  such that for a ﬁxed  an inventor is liquidity
constrained. There are two cases to analyze. (1) If the inventor does not meet a partner, the
constrained investment level is ∗ =  for  
()1− = b () It is easy to see that
the function b () is increasing in  because  ∈ (01). (2) If the inventor meets a partner,
we have ∗ =  for  
()1− = b (). Again, it is easy to see that the function
b () is increasing in  because  ∈ (01) Second, we show that b () is increasing with
the inventor’s assets  up to a level of inventor’s assets where b () is independent of .
Let us consider a suﬃciently high level of invention quality  and partner ability  such that a
partnership can be proﬁtable. Note that for a given  and , there exits a level of inventor’s assets
() above which the inventor is not liquidity constrained. Above this level of inventor assets,
the cutoﬀ rule b () will be independent of  because the partner does not provide value
added through the channel of relaxing liquidity constraints. Below the level of assets (),
the inventor is liquidity constrained and thus the partner provides additional value added through
relaxing the liquidity constraint. Note that the higher the assets of the inventor, the lower the
potential beneﬁts of partnership and thus the higher is the cutoﬀ b ().
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